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The Normative Threat of Subtle Subversion: The Return of ‘Eastern Europe’ as an 
Ontological Insecurity Trope 
Abstract 
A combination of undemocratic developments in Hungary and Poland and the eastern 
Europeans’ foot-dragging about solidary burden-sharing at the height of the refugee crisis in 
Europe has brought back the familiar allusions of eastern Europeans as troublemakers for the 
European unity and peace. This article offers a discursive dissection of ‘eastern Europe’ as a 
subtly subversive challenge to Europe’s security of ‘self’, entailing a fear of being overrun by 
an ‘Other’ perceived as endangering one’s particular normative and cultural order. Proceeding 
from Ingrid Creppell’s (2011) notion of normative threat, I argue that the reappearance of 
‘eastern Europe’ as an ontological insecurity trope points at a set of deeper anxieties within 
Europe, some of which are systemic (doubts about the efficacy of integration and the 
legitimacy of the European Union) and some more contingent (vacillation about defending the 
European political order from populist upsurge amidst ‘resurgent nationalism’). 
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The more things change, the more they stay the same. On surface, the post-Cold War 
evolutionary curve from the high hopes of thoroughly transforming the formerly Soviet-bound 
east European region to the re-emergence of anxiety about certain Central-East European 
states’ subtle subversion of the European order and way of life has been nothing short of 
extraordinary. A combination of undemocratic developments in Hungary and Poland and a 
general lack of enthusiasm of the east Europeans for solidary burden-sharing at the height of 
the refugee/migration crisis in Europe have brought back the familiar tropes of eastern 
Europeans as ‘not quite like us’ – as cunning schemers and adamant nationalists for some, and 
troublemakers for the European unity and peace for others. In various guises, ‘ea t rn Europe’ 
has reappeared as a challenge to the European normative order and the EU’s sense of security. 
Why is this happening? What makes eastern Europe a particular cause for concern amongst 
the many travails the EU is currently facing (or only just beginning to recover from), such as 
the Eurocrisis, migration surge and the related solidarity crisis, the rise of far right and populist 
politics throughout Europe, and Brexit? This article grapples with the return of the mimetic 
wall between ‘eastern Europe’ and ‘Europe’ by way of thinking through the relationship 
between ontological security (OS)/insecurity (OIS), normative threats, and liminality. Spelling 
out the linkages between these notions, I seek to contribute to a more refined empirical 
understanding of the operational logic, patterns of occurrence, and ethico-political 
consequences of normative threat depictions in action. I do so via poststructuralist discourse 
analysis, drawing on Hansen’s (2006) model of linking and differentiation in the study of 
identity formation through canvassing the pertinent political, academic and media debates.  
The argument about the rturn of ‘eastern Europe’ as an OIS trope makes three points. 
First, the ‘problem with eastern Europe’ highlights the cross-pollination within the proposed 




existential parameters of self and social identity (Giddens 1984, 375), and its mirror notion of 
OIS, are synergistic with the notion of normative threat, defined as ‘a promise of harm to the 
political body through defiance of basic principles of order and right that constitute one’s 
group’ (Creppell 2011, 450). Normative threats jeopardize the established conceptions of self 
and the world, promising to dislocate the moral self-affirmation of a community, disturb its 
existing routines and undermine the trust within. They are thus particularly potent generators 
of OIS as a state of uncertainty about one’s identity and place in the world, leading to an upset 
sense of agency. Liminality as an in-between condition which entails challenges both for the 
figures and groups suspended in the transitional state and those defining the boundaries of the 
‘normal state’ and the transition thereof (Horvath et al 2015) adds a further critical nuance to 
our understanding of the functioning of political communities and the normative orders they 
seek to sustain. Through their anti-structural qualities and order-upending potential, liminal 
groups illuminate the limits and contradictions of a structure currently in place (Rumelili 2012, 
496; Turner [1969] 1995). Liminal actors are thus by definition ontologically upsetting for the 
guardians of the existing order.1 I suggest that the conflict of values between the liberal EU 
mainstream and certain Central-East European populist governments and ideologues, 
unapologetically focused on their national sovereignty and values, appears to be particularly 
disturbing for the EU’s positive sense of self precisely for the normative challenge’s emergence 
from within the cohort of ‘new Europeans’, now evidently rebelling against their designated 
position of meek converts into the liberal inclusionary norms of the EU convention. The main 
                                                 
1 As compellingly captured by Mária Schmidt, a vociferous defender of the Orbán’s version of democracy in 
Hungary, in the following quote: ‘While [the western half of Europe] see[s] themselves as being able to integrate 
millions of Muslim migrants, they are unable to even tolerate us, who – like them – have been socialized within 
the Graeco-Roman and Judaeo-Christian traditions. They consider “the other” to be beautiful, but we are too 




fronts of the discursive battleground of the unfolding European Kulturkampf (cf. Trencsényi 
2014) include, on the one side, the official bespeakers of Europe (e.g., European Parliament 
2016, 2017; Venice Commission 2017; Timmermans 2018), EU federalists (e.g., Verhofstadt 
2017b), and the anti-populists2 of various feathers; academic critics of illiberal models of 
governance in Central-East Europe (e.g., Kim Lane Scheppele and Jan-Werner Müller of 
Princeton University); mainstream West European media and popular icons,3 all highly critical 
of the ‘brand of Europe’ propounded by Hungary’s Viktor Orbán and Poland’s Jaroslaw 
Kaczynski. On the other, there are the ideological explicators and mnemonic warriors of the 
latter ‘discourse circle’ (cf. Elder-Vass 2011, 10), voicing their pro-nation, anti-EU, anti-
Muslim immigration sentiments (e.g., Schmidt 2015, 2018) in conjunction with the liberal free 
speech campaigners, seeking to serve as sympathetic interpreters in this supposed ‘act of 
miscommunication’ between the two sides (whilst accusing the West European states/the EU 
of double standards vis-à-vis the east) (e.g., Furedi 2018, 3).  
Second, the return of ‘eastern Europe’ as a normative threat marks the reactivation of a 
well-sedimented framework of intelligibility regarding the region (cf. Laclau 2014; Nabers 
2015). This is demonstrated by a concise cut into the shifting scripts of eastern Europe from 
the early post-Cold War era to the recent recurrence of popular connotations of eastern 
European countries with the normative breaches of, or the looming potential to, profoundly 
                                                 
2
 Albeit populism could be regarded as ‘the ultimate essentially contested concept’ (Kinnvall, this issue), its core 
characteristics are generally taken to include a revolt against the ruling elites, anti-pluralism, and a moral claim to 
represent ‘the people’ (Müller 2016c). It is the latter that appears as most abrasive for the democratic credentials 
of the European polity, as the populists commonly criticize the un-accountability nd technocratic, rather than 
politically representative and visionary nature of governance by the EU (cf. Browning, this issue). 
3 http://hungarytoday.hu/news/u2-frontman-bono-blasts-hyper-nationalist-hungary-poland-existential-threat-




endanger the European order in spe. The convergence of eastern Europe’s historically liminal 
position in Europe’s self-definition with the growth of populist-nationalist politics in the region 
amplifies the power of the socially and politically perceived normative threat in question.  
Third, and relatedly, ‘normative threat eastern Europe’ brings to bear on the topic of 
populism the nostalgia for a past state of the European community as a more tight-knit and 
unreservedly ‘Western’ affair (cf. Steele, this issue). Populism is generally depicted as an 
eroding force of the normative essence of the contemporary European polity for its targeting 
of liberal democratic membership norms (Thomas 2017). Curiously, eastern Europeans 
concurrently emerge as the objects of populist politics4 and as the embodiments of populism, 
depicting non-native elements as fundamentally threatening to the nation-state. They are thus 
widely held responsible for generating the moral panic related to the most recent 
migration/refugee crisis in Europe (Walker and Gyori 2018; see Furedi 2018 and Schmidt 2018 
for examples).  
Yet, as David Runciman quips, ‘[j]ust because democracies have been guilty of crying wolf 
in the past doesn’t mean there is no wolf out there’ (2018, 317). Let me thus stress at the outset 
what I am not arguing here: I do not seek to placate valid concerns and criticism about the 
unreeling of central democratic principles and values in Hungary and Poland (such as 
infringements on the separation of powers, the rule of law, media and academic freedom, and 
civil society organization in recent years). Nor do I wish to mollify the questionable record of 
Visegrád states in contributing to the constructive handling of the refugee/migration crisis in 
Europe.5 Instead, my aim is to highlight how the developments in the empirical reality of 
                                                 
4 As in the context of Brexit, and the broader European debates displaying fear and aversion toward the phantom 
figure of the ‘Polish plumber’ as a symbol of West European welfare chauvinism (cf. Noyes 2018). 
5 Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia refused to participate in the relocation scheme of the asylum-




eastern Europe are widely read through an interpretive lens of an embedded socio-cultural 
resource (or a discursive structure) about what ‘eastern Europe’ allegedly stands for.  
The argument unfolds in four parts. I begin by dissecting the ternary of normative threats, 
ontological (in)security and liminality. I suggest that the two sub-types of Creppell’s (2011) 
notion of normative threat – transgression (prompting grievance) and subversion (eliciting 
insecurity for a fear of being overrun by an ‘Other’ perceived as endangering one’s particular 
normative and cultural order) – are particularly illuminating for understanding the 
contemporary east European predicament. The next section illustrates the main features of the 
discourse depicting eastern Europe as a normative challenge to the EU with reference to 
important academic and policy works in the field, along with illustrations from the EU’s 
political discourse and the related debates in the media. Normative threats function as 
harbingers of dreaded change in the accustomed ways of life and expectations about the rules 
governing relationships within a community (Creppell 2011, 455). Hungary’s and Poland’s 
challenge to liberal democracy as a constitutive norm of the European community and he 
Visegrád states’ distinct takes on solidarity as a core value of the EU in the context of handling 
the migration surge are key moments here. A concise retrospective of ‘eastern Europe’ as a 
subtle normative challenge to the EU’s security of self from the 1990s to the contemporary era 
follows suit. The conclusion sums up the main implications of the argument presented here and 
suggests some further research perspectives.  
 
A promise of harm: unpacking the relationship between normative threats, ontological 
(in)security and liminality 
                                                 






Normative threats refer to understanding the threat experience as beyond physical material 
damage, as ‘promises of destruction to something essential about one’s group or nation’ 
(Creppell 2011, 452). According to Creppell (2011, 450), 
 
perceptions of threat emerge and carry a heightened emotional and moral energy when basic 
features of a political body’s normative order appear to be at stake… /--/. Normative order 
comprises a set of principles citizens believe to be necessary for the functioning, justifiability, 
and indeed ‘reality’ of their political body.  
Based on the premise that ‘[h]umans care as much about losing their particularistic forms of 
existence as they care about death itself’ (Creppell 2011, 455), the notion of normative threat 
intrinsically resonates with that of OIS. While OS refers to a condition underpinning the actor’s 
agency and a sense of continuity in the world (Mitzen 2006a; Steele 2008), OIS signifies the 
relative lack of the former, indicating a state of disruption and the related inability of collectives 
to ‘sustain a linear narrative and answer questions about doing, acting and being’ (Kinnvall 
and Mitzen 2017, 7). Normative threats explicitly disturb an actor’s ‘security as being’ 
(Giddens 1991) by generating anxiety and portending harm for their potential to introduce an 
alternative (and possibly potent) order (Creppell 2011, 471). Due to their hypothetical power 
to unsettle a particular order (be it internal or external, retrospective or prospective) (Creppell 
2011, 470-473), normative threats have a distinctly OIS-generating clout. Normative threats 
emerge and are dreaded precisely for their promise to upend something fundamental holding a 
specific political body together, along with dislocating terms of relationships among that polity 
and its counterparts in the world at large (Creppell 2011, 484). As per Creppell (2011), the 
promise of normative breach can manifest in three principal modes: transgression, subversion, 




the danger-detecting community, respectively. Transgression of a normative order threatens to 
betray the shared expectations, or the implicit and/or explicit norms on the basis of which the 
said order operates (Creppell 2011, 475-479). Subversion pertains to the anxieties about the 
sustainability of a habitual way of life in face of someone or something alien to one’s self, with 
a looming onset of an unfamiliar and undesirable order (Creppell 2011, 479-481). It 
encapsulates a fear of infiltration, closely resonating with a vulnerability in one’s self (Creppell 
2011, 482).  Abomination, in turn, is the type of normative threat challenging the basic 
background assumptions about the proper parameters of human conduct more generally. It is 
therefore not limited to one’s own immediate political community, pertaining to the ground 
norms of human behaviour instead (Creppell 2011, 481-484). As the concise discursive 
dissection will demonstrate in the next section, the former two types of normative threat – 
transgression and subversion – are central for understanding the return of ‘eastern Europe’ as 
a manifold source of OIS in recent years. 
 The historically liminal position of eastern Europe in the political imaginaries of those 
who have traditionally enjoyed a sense of entitlement to speak and act in the name of Europe 
has provided a hospitable soil for the wide reading of the recent developments in Central-East 
Europe through the prism of normative threat for the European project of democracy, unity, 
and peace. As Victor Turner ([1969] 1995), 108-109) showed in his study of the Ndembu rites, 
the custodians of the current structure are by definition wary of the transgressive and order-
transcending potential of the liminal communities. Liminality is therefore not just another tag 
for marginal, borderline or hybrid actors, spaces and states of being/transitioning, but an 
important conceptual lens for illuminating the constitution of social order of international 
politics more generally (Rumelili 2012; Mälksoo 2012). The ongoing contestation between 
structure and liminality (‘where social structure seeks to domesticate liminality by positioning 




categories by presenting the possibility of an in-between existence’) serves as a continuous 
reminder of the limits and contradictions of structure (Rumelili 2012, 496). Liminal groups are 
hence innately challenging for the extant structure/order and its (self-appointed) guardians as 
liminal actors embody the possibility of transgressing the norms governing the current structure 
in place (Turner [1969] 1995, 128). They highlight the existing order’s limits and constraints 
(Turner [1969] 1995, 167) and entail a promise of an alternative order. Crisis and social change 
do not just ‘represent the manifestation of power relations’ (Nabers 2015, 195), but also bring 
forth the opportunity of the reversal of the present relations by unravelling rather than 
reproducing the existing structure/order.  
Historically, eastern Europe has been constituted as ‘less-Europe’, rather than ‘anti-
Europe’ or ‘non-Europe’ (cf. Rumelili 2012, 498). The region’s relative incongruence with the 
European standards, norms and expectations of behaviour and governance has accordingly 
been deemed a subject of socialization. The post-C ld War ‘Europeanization’ of eastern 
European states via their integration into the European political and security structures, 
particularly the EU, emerged as the attempted domestication of the historical east European 
liminality by repositioning eastern Europeans in one of the existing social categories available 
(i.e. ‘normal Europe’ and ‘Europeans’) (Mälksoo 2010; cf. Rumelili 2012, 498-504). The 
processes of domestication by the West(ern European states) and self-domestication by the 
eastern European states themselves effectively sought to reproduce the social order of Europe. 
The clear juxtaposition by some eastern European states of themselves against the constitutive 
norms and values of the EU in recent years (such as the consolidation of ‘illiberal democracy’ 
in Hungary or the infringements of the separation of powers in Poland, along with the recent 
introduction of the highly controversial Holocaust-complicity negation law) demonstrates the 
subversive potential of liminal actors: their embracing of their difference (‘ambiguity and in-




normative order underpinning the EU community). Admittedly, the incomplete and contested 
nature of European integration makes the EU’s normative wholeness by definition an aspiration 
rather than a fully materialized empirical reality. The EU’s proneness to OIS and its sensitivity 
towards normative threats is a multi-level problem due to the sui generis nature of the Union. 
Logically, it should be explored on multiple levels of analysis, ranging from the EU as a 
supranational civic and legal order to its member states, societies and individuals therein (cf. 
Rumelili 2018). Importantly, the Central-East European apologists of illiberal democracy do 
not negate Europe, but posit a distinct vision of it with an emphasis on ‘organic’ national 
communities, Christian tradition, and national/popular sovereignty. Their scorn of 
multiculturalism, minority rights, and disdain of Europe’s ‘culture of victimhood’ (i.e. the EU’s 
alleged inability ‘to stand up for its own values, way of life and culture’; Schmidt 2018, 61-62) 
goes against the grain of the ideal-type depiction of the EU’s normative order with the rule of 
law, respect for civil liberties, human and minority rights, gender equality, multiculturalism 
and minority cultures, multi-level governance and relatively liberal forms of representative 
government at its heart (cf. Bideleux 2015, 24). Instead of the EU-enshrined values of 
pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, and solidarity (no matter how skewed in 
reality), the emphasis of the Central-East European populists is brazenly on the securitization 
of their ‘national selves’, traditions and values – a fictional idea of the homogenous and 
authentic ‘past self’.   
While the Brexit referendum on the UK’s membership in the EU has generated a fair 
share of dread and ontological anxiety for the ‘Remainers’ (Browning 2018) and the EU alike 
(Mogherini 2016); and the anti-establishment, exclusionary parties have been even more 
significantly on the rise in West European states compared to their post-communist 
counterparts, populist mobilizations in the traditionally liminal states of Central-East Europe 




part, this is due to Britain’s commitment to the European project having always been half-
hearted and the EU’s dealing with the separation process consequently rather matter-of-factly, 
and the nationalist parties in the heart of the EU having yet to reach the kind of power Fidesz 
and PiS are enjoying in Hungary and Poland. Above all, the conflicting perspectives on 
sovereignty (national and popular) and the distinct takes on tradition and the past between some 
Central-East European states and the EU (Furedi 2018, 9) flag the inconsistencies in the post-
Cold War self-congratulatory narrative of the Union as a successful promoter of democracy, 
an efficient socializer of east European ‘students’ into an inclusionary liberal norm-set, and the 
bold unifier of the continent thereof. Central-East European backlash to the perceived post-
nationalist, cosmopolitan, and federalist agendas of the European elites (cf. Auer 2010) disturbs 
the foundational myth of the Union which depicts European integration as the result of an 
aspiration to overcome nationalism in order to ensure the stability and security of the continent 
(Della Sala 2016). Whereas the EU’s autobiographical myth is ‘breaking with the past’ (Della 
Sala 2018), this is understood as ‘one of embarrassed alienation’, and juxtaposed to the east 
Europeans’ ‘respect’ towards the past in Hungary (Furedi 2018, 81). The EU’s conception of 
European identity and solidarity based on an ethical self-distancing of the continent’s 
nationalist legacies stands in sharp contrast with the pride and primary affiliation found in 
national pasts in certain Central-East European states. The resurgent nationalism is deemed 
dangerous for Europe not only for the polarizing and exclusionary effects for democratic 
politics, but also for the potentially more intense and captivating affective basis such alternative 
vision of the European identity proffers.6 Nationalist assurance of a more organic and cohesive 
community might be a fantasy, but it nonetheless promises a hotter emotional attachment to 
people and hence remains unsettling for the cooler type of solidaristic belonging the EU has on 
                                                 





In all, the discourse of east European transgression and subversion of the European 
norms and values and the related political developments in the region have contributed to the 
reappearance of ‘eastern Europe’ as a threat-trope for the liberal European normative order, 
pointing at a set of deeper anxieties within the EU, some of which are systemic (doubts about 
the efficacy of integration and the legitimacy of the Union) and some more contingent 
(vacillation about defending the European political order from populist upsurge) (cf. Müller 
2016b).  
 
‘Eastern Europe Goes South’7 
 
In recent years, the problem of ‘east Europeanness’ as a problem of difference within the 
European polity has returned with gusto. This problem, described tongue-in-ch ek by an 
Estonian writer and conservative columnist as a PITA-problem for Europe (Mutt 2016, 13) 
appears in two main modalities: first, as an already materialized harm (and the looming promise 
of further damage) in Hungary’s and Poland’s violation of democratic rules of the game; and 
second, as a threat of a retroactive normative order returning and thus endangering the present 
‘self’ of Europe (as exemplified by the reluctance to accepting refugees and the alleged general 
xenophobia in eastern European countries). Cumulatively, the normative threat of eastern 
Europe is purportedly jeopardizing liberal democracy as a constitutive norm and solidarity as 
an underlying value of the European community. This section will unfold these facets of 
constructing eastern Europe as a normative threat along with their related emotional prompts 
in turn. 
 
                                                 





Among general concerns about the ‘unravelling’ of the post-1989 liberal order (Krastev 
2016b), there are particularly acute worries about ‘disappearing democracy in the EU’s newest 
members’ (Müller 2014). Jan-Werner Müller describes the accompanying feeling as ‘Central 
Europe [] living 1989 in reverse’, as ‘a new Authoritarian International’ is emerging in the 
region (Müller 2016a). Scholars ruminate whether Hungary8 nd Poland9 should be regarded 
as solidifying illiberal democracies, or even emerging examples of hybrid regimes – as new 
paragons of competitive authoritarianism, wherein free and fair elections are combined with 
considerable restraints on the separation of powers (the independence of judiciary, media, and 
civic unions), the rule of law, opposition, and civil liberties (Levitsky and Way, 2010).10 
Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s policies certainly meet three of the four key 
indicators of authoritarian behaviour, as developed by Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018, 21-24): the 
rejection of (or weak commitment to) democratic rules of the game; denial of the legitimacy of 
political opponents, and readiness to curtail liberties of opponents, including media. Levitsky 
and Ziblatt identify both Hungary (post-May 2010) and Poland (post-November 2015) as 
‘mildly authoritarian’ (2018, 188). Béla Greskovits takes distinct note of the ‘hollowing’ (or 
declining popular involvement) and ‘backsliding’ of democracy (that is, destabilization and 
reverting to semi-authoritarian practices) in East Central Europe (Greskovits 2015, 28). The 
European Parliament has expressed explicit concern about the ‘danger to democracy, human 
                                                 
8 On Hungary’s illiberal turn, see further Tóth (2012); Verluise (2012); Lendvai (2012); Müller (2012); Fletcher 
(2017). 
9 See Ost (2016). 
10 For discussion, see Isaac (2017). See further Müller (2016a), who argues against the murky notion of ‘illiberal 
democracy’ in the cases of Hungary and Poland, preferring the descriptor of ‘populist authoritarianism’ instead. 




rights and the rule of law’ in Poland in relation to the PiS government’s manoeuvres to gain 
control of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal and the autonomy of the judges (European 
Parliament 2016), thus effectively threatening the politicization of the court system in Poland 
(Grabbe and Lehne 2017). Poland’s and Hungary’s transgression of the EU rules of the game 
has evoked palpable grievance of ‘the dream is over’-kind, as once celebrated democratic 
transition success stories are now considered ‘at the forefront of the movement toward illiberal 
democracy’ (Mounk, 2016).  
The concern is not only about eastern Europe ‘going South’ (Müller 2014), but the 
disturbing trend of detaching democracy from the commitment to liberal values is regarded as 
potentially fateful for the viability of the liberal democratic model of governance and, by 
consequence, the EU as a whole. A fear of a slippery slope is evident throughout the manifold 
academic, policy and media debates: his ‘clear threat to democracy at the heart of the European 
Union’ (Cormaic 2017) in Poland’s and Hungary’s defiance of the rule of law and legally 
binding decisions of the EU is deemed to present ‘a risk of contagion’ for the EU, along with 
the threat of the latter’s loss of ‘cohesion’ and ‘external clout’ (Grabbe and Lehne 2017; Cooper 
2017; Uitz 2018). Specifically, the EU is ‘in threat’ over pressuring the academic freedom in 
the Central European University’s case and the treatment of asylum-seekers in Hungary (BBC 
2017). Hungary’s ‘assault on academic freedom is a threat to European principles’ (Lyer 2017; 
see also Timmermans 2017); indeed, ‘to freedom everywhere’ (Botstein et al 2017). As 
Europe’s inner boundaries are marked by the extent of liberal democracy and the rule of law 
(Müller 2013), Orbán’s populist experiment is perceived as challenging the ‘moral core of the 
European project’ (Müller 2015). Thus the grim warning that ‘ he Western liberal order’s 
apparent collapse in 2016 could turn out to be yet another historic upheaval that began in 
Eastern Europe’ (Kisilowski 2017). Two uncomfortable questions underpin this thread of the 




heart of the EU’s vision of its self. First, has the Union actually fulfilled its democracy-building 
promise with acceding the post-communist states (or what exactly went wrong) (Krastev 
2016a, 36)? Secondly, is the EU in fact equipped with proper legal and political instruments to 
intervene in case its members are undermining the Union’s functioning principles in practice? 
(cf. Müller 2014) The Union’s apparent caution in applying the sanctioning mechanism of its 
punishment clause of Article 7 of the Treaty of the EU to Hungary and Poland is evocative in 
that regard. 
Some find a quantum of solace in the assertion that in the east European case, ‘there 
has never been much to hollow out in the first place’ (Greskovits 2015, 30). Dawson and 
Hanley (2016, 23), for instance, regard East-Central Europe’s democratic consolidation ‘as 
having always been somewhat illusory’. Views are further divided about the particularly east 
European versus a more universal nature of the current democratic malaise. For some, illiberal 
norms have long cohabited with liberal ones in the political centre ground across the East-
Central-Europe, recently overpowering the former (Dawson and Hanley 2016, 23). For others, 
the upsurge of illiberalism in the region is less about weak elite commitment to the values of 
liberal democracy and more about a genuine failure of liberalism to deliver (Krastev 2016a, 
36-37). 
Two overarching features of the discourse are noteworthy: a generalization from 
concrete cases (Hungary and Poland) to the region as a whole,11 and a strongly moral language, 
potently exemplified by the recurrence of the theologically-flavoured term ‘backsliding’, 
referring to reverting to old sins (Jenne and Mudde 2012; Krastev 2016a, 36). The association 
of wider ‘eastern Europe’ with the onslaught and spread of ‘illiberal democracy’ evokes 
profound anxieties at multiple levels. The illiberal challenge of Orbán’s rule in Hungary and 
                                                 
11 Müller (2014) maintains that ‘the problems with the union’s eastern European members have grown so 




that of Law and Justice party’s in Poland appears as a normative threat of transgression and 
subtle subversion for the liberal democratic normative order underpinning the contemporary 
European project. The transgression of well-articulated democratic norms and intersubjectively 
acknowledged standards of behaviour in the EU by two of the weightiest Central-East 
European member states of the Union has exposed an internal vulnerability and generated a 
sensation of harm in the European community. Hungary’s and Poland’s lack of respect for a 
set of central democratic principles underpinning the ‘European project’ illuminates the 
attachment of the EU (and those who speak in its name) to democratic norms, indeed, a deep 
identitarian dependence on and caring about the acknowledgement and maintenance of the 




The east European region’s contemporary ‘problem of difference’ has been further exacerbated 
by the public reluctance of its elites and populace to share the burden of solidarity in Europe’s 
most recent migration/refugee crisis (see Dingott Alkopher 2018 for a detailed discussion). 
This crisis has ‘reopened the gap between East and the West’ (Krastev 2016c, 112). Yet, it is 
not simply a ‘lack of solidarity’ on the east Europeans’ part that is at issue here, but a clash of 
competing solidarities (national, ethnic, religious, European) grinding against each other 
(Krastev 2016c, 112; Porter 2016). The images about the treatment of asylum-seekers and the 
accompanying rhetoric from Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, in particular, have 
been reciprocated by intensely emotional reactions (e.g., Euractiv 2016; Kopytowska and 
Grabowski 2017; Kosicki 2016; Segeš Frelak 2017). Blaming the east Europeans’ reluctance 
to accept refugees to their lack of a ‘sense of shame’ and the incomplete process of coming to 




surge in Europe as an eye-opener of ‘the unfinished business of transition in the newest member 
states in the East, where democratic institutions are weak, where old reflexes dominate, where 
nationalism blinds, and where in the name of “Christianity”, the most un-Christian decisions 
are made’ (Simonyi 2015; see further Krastev 2016b, 92; Ben-Ami 2016). This goes against 
the grain of the contemporary European (peace) project, the ‘other’ of which is ‘its own past 
which should not be allowed to become its future’ (Wæver 1998, 90). The Visegrád countries’ 
staunch emphasis on their sovereign right to refuse abiding by the EU refugee quotas strikes 
the critics as an embodiment of that past Europe of territorially exclusive sovereign nation-
states. Orbán’s praising of the virtues of illiberal governance (Orbán 2014) and the recent 
memory law put in place by the PiS government in Poland12 appear as further reminders of the 
lack of self-reflexivity and self-transcendence on part of the east European members in the 
European community which routinely juxtaposes its present ‘self’ to the undemocratic legacies 
and the related crimes and human rights violations of the Second World War-era. ‘Eastern 
Europe’ emerges as a warning of a creeping return of this retrospective self, as the region’s 
core states demonstrate an apparent disregard for the settled parameters of the European 
normative order where the ‘othering’ of authoritarianism along with the self-reflexivity and 
acknowledgement of the co-responsibility for the Holocaust in Europe have been the central 
animating forces behind the European integration project and the construction of the EU-
ropean identity (cf. Subotic, this issue).13 Orbán’s and PiS’s policies create utter discomfort 
                                                 
12 The so-called ‘Holocaust-law’ of January 2018, amending an earlier memory law in Poland, penalizes public 
statements that ‘accuse the Polish nation, or the Polish state, of being responsible or complicit in the Nazi crimes 
committed by the Third German Reich’ (Gross 2018). 
13 As most evocatively expressed by Verhofstadt to Orbán in the European Parliament debate on Hungary (2017a): 





within the European community as they raise questions about the actual success of the EU in 
democratizing and socializing the eastern European states and nations sufficiently into the 
normative frameworks of governance of the European polity. The pro-sovereignty, anti-
immigration discourses of the Visegrád countries further point at the limits of the liberal 
democratic model of government and Germany’s open-door policy-related contradictions 
within the wider EU community (Dingott Alkopher 2018).  
From the perspective of the EU, a distinct reading of the European lessons of the 
twentieth century in the context of the most recent refugee/migration crisis in the East and West 
of Europe serves as a warning of Europe’s subtle subversion by the normatively different ‘other 
within’ (cf. Creppell 2011, 475-480), feared to be able to hollow out and discredit the European 
democratic order, effectively rendering it unworkable. It is as if the multiple recent crises have 
exposed an internal liability for the unity and normative cohesion of the EU in the form of 
‘eastern Europe’ – a failure of sufficient integration, endangering the EU’s progressive self-
narrative as an efficient democracy promoter and the main guarantor of peace and security in 
the continent. An emerging illiberal communitas of Hungary and Poland, and of the right-wing 
populist parties in eastern Europe more generally is seen as a particularly ‘grave threat to the 
EU’ (Hutton 2018). While such formation of small group alliances is typical to the members 
of a particular stigma category (Goffmann 1963, 23), the danger of subversion by that liminal 
group in its trending of illiberalism and toying with a ‘return of the dark past of Europe’ 
provides an incentive for the European community to re-claim its collective power through 
stressing the very subversive threat or grievance from that alternative group within the political 
community (Creppell 2011, 474). Accordingly, in June 2017 the European Commission 
introduced infringement procedures against Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic for their 




Taken together, the normative breaches foreboded by eastern European states for the 
OS of the European community illustrate the importance of path dependency in the 
effectiveness of normative threat emergence, perception and framing as such. The pattern of 
thinking that eastern Europe is a normative challenge that needs to be ‘fixed’ or ‘socialized’ to 
become a ‘full’ and ‘integral’ European subject has a long pedigree, as the next section briefly 
illustrates. A parallel dynamic has historically informed the constitution of European political 
subjectivity: the EU’s OS needs have been routinely identified and met in relation to such 
duties of care for the other(s) (Mitzen 2006b). 
 
From the ‘Barbarians at the Gate’ to ‘Barbarians Within’ 
The semi-Orientalist underpinnings of ‘eastern Europe’ as a discursive concept (as mobilized 
by ‘the West’) have been comprehensively analysed by historians, literary scholars and 
political scientists over two decades now (Wolff 1994; Kuus 2007; Todorova 2009; Mälksoo 
2010; Zarycki 2014). Eastern Europe has historically occupied the position of ‘defined’, rather 
than been involved in the process of defining itself and others. Since its Enlightenment origins, 
the concept of ‘eastern Europe’ has encapsulated the state of in-betweenness in Europe’s self-
image, measuring the distance between civilization and barbarism on the developmental scale 
envisioned by Western Europe (Wolff 1994, 4-13). The idea that crossing Europe from west to 
east means leaving behind ‘civilization’ and entering a zone of ‘backwardness’ has remained 
a predominant image in popular imagination, numerous journalistic accounts, and even some 
scholarship (Kubik 2014, 360).  
 This is the case despite the fact that the end of the Cold War fuelled unprecedented 
hopes that both ‘West’ (as a ‘synonym for advancement, culture, freedom and decency’) and 
‘East’ (as an equivalent of ‘underdevelopment, callous authoritarianism and omnipresent 




materialize, as we now know. Rather, the collapse of the Eastern bloc only enhanced ‘western 
chauvinism’ (Delanty 1995, 140), displaying a fear of the advance of the ‘Wild East’ and 
presuming that only ‘they’ on the other side of the Berlin Wall had to change (Eyal 1997, 696). 
The post-Cold War eastward enlargement debates of the EU and NATO frequently exposed 
concerns about the looming change in the Euro-Atlantic structures and the ability of the 
European ‘self’ to continue living as itself in the future. This idea figured quite prominently in 
not just off-the-record policy and many on-the-record journalistic discussions, but in the 
scholarship on EU enlargement, and the related socialization process of eastern European 
countries it called for, as well. 14 The dual enlargement debates evocatively manifested Western 
Europe’s historical outlook toward eastern Europe as swinging between an effort to civilize the 
‘barbarians’ and a basic urge to leave these ‘far away countries of whom we know nothing’ (to 
borrow the infamous appeasement-expression of Chamberlain) on their own. The consequent 
debates about the preferred foci of the European security culture and the memory regime of the 
twentieth-century legacies reiterated a normative hierarchy between various ‘Europes’ and 
‘Europeans’, with discursively salient tropes of ‘badly brought up East Europeans’ versus 
‘postmodern Westerners’ (Mälksoo 2010, chapters 4-6).  
East European response to this hierarchy has been a mixture of acceptance and 
resistance. On the one hand, a role of ‘younger Europeans’ has generally been deferred to, 
particularly during the open-end period of the dual enlargement processes of the EU and 
NATO. On the other, East European political leaders from Václav Havel and Lennart Meri in 
the 1990s to Viktor Orbán in the contemporary era have frequently endorsed their identity as 
more Catholic than a Pope – as embodiments of an even ‘truer Europe’ than Western Europe, 
                                                 
14 As captured in the caustic observation by Douzinas (2017, 182): ‘The rapid expansion from six to twenty-eight 
members added to the club of post-Communist states, which were economically, culturally and politically distant 




assuming the messianistic role of telling ‘Europe’ what it needs to do in order to remain 
‘Europe’. For example, the east Europeans’ challenging of the singularity of Holocaust as the 
negative foundational myth of the EU in the 2000s constituted a distinct defiance of the West-
centric frames of remembrance in the EU’s pre-eastern enlargement mnemonic regime of the 
Second World War and the twentieth-century totalitarianisms, as the east European states 
sought to foreground the criminal legacy of communism next to that of the Nazis (Mälksoo 
2009, 2014; Bernhard and Kubik 2014).  
Although the window of 1989-1991 undoubtedly marked a critical juncture in the 
process of east Europeans’ ‘becoming European’, the mind-set about their ‘lesser 
Europeanness’ persists in new iterations (cf. Mutt 2016). Notably, neither the resurgence of 
‘eastern Europe’ as a problem-trope nor the community displaying alarm and moral superiority 
thereof follow the standard western vs. eastern European line of contrast any more. The eastern 
enlargement of the EU has produced various levels of normative internalization of the core 
values of the united Europe project in the Central-East European region. The pejorative 
associations with ‘eastern Europe’ were on display in the recent public debate over the Global 
Compact for Migration in Estonia, for example, where the foreign policy establishment deemed 




After intense decades of Europeanization and democratization, eastern Europe as Europe’s 
historically defined in-between foil has re-emerged as a normative challenge in public, political 




along with popular (and populist) reactions to the recent migration crisis in Europe. The 1990s’ 
trope of the ‘barbarians at the gate’ has given way to a subtler ‘barbarians within’-discourse. 
For the academic community, there is noticeable resentment about eastern Europe, in 
many ways, failing as a laboratory of democratization and normative socialization into the 
European community of liberal democratic norms and values. The return of the familiar script 
of eastern Europe as a threat of transgression and subtle subversion of Europe’s normative 
order provides inter alia a routine way for the policy and academic communities to alleviate 
some anxieties in the midst of the multiple contemporary crises. From an institutional 
perspective of the EU, it is as if an embedded identitarian control mechanism has been 
reactivated in order to escape a paralysing sense of OIS amidst the upheavals the Union faces 
from within and the external world in this day and age. The re-appearance of eastern Europe 
as a challenge to the European (liberal democratic) normative order could accordingly be 
interpreted as a late recurrence of Europe’s post-Cold War ‘peace anxieties’, generating an 
endeavour to re-instate the pre-existing objects of fear, systems of meaning and standards of 
moral purpose (Rumelili 2015). Yet, as Browning and Joenniemi remind us (2017, 32), OS is 
not just about stability but also adaptability or openness towards and the ability to cope with 
change. The allocation of meaning to the trope of ‘eastern Europe’, and its mobilization thereof, 
point at a perpetual struggle over power to define what Europe is, and what it should be like. 
Two main implications emanate from this truncated discourse analysis. First, the re-
emergence of Central-East Europe as a normative challenge for the European order also serves 
as a warning against a common tendency to generalize from the far-from-universal 
developments in the region. While such a penchant is less frequent in the official political 
discourse of the EU and the academic accounts, it is wide-spread in the media depictions. The 
rise of populist parties and politics in eastern Europe underscores the importance of analytical 




transitions, and the imperative to turn the investigative focus more seriously to the societal 
meanings of transition and the everyday insecurities as experienced by the communities in 
question (Mälksoo 2018). Moreover, sustained comparisons between the populist political 
developments within both eastern and western Europe would be instrumental, as the upsurge 
of populist movements and the entry of populist parties into ruling establishment has been 
hardly unique to the east European region over the last decade (Browning, this issue). 
Secondly, the populist and illiberal politics of some eastern European countries serve 
as a reminder of the political potency of long-term stigmatizing practices15 b ing turned into 
objects of manipulation in the hands of their original targets/referent objects, thus refuelling a 
cycle of mutual securitization and fear-mongering. The re-m rgence of ‘eastern Europe’ as a 
normative threat for the EU could hence also be read as a case of an internally flustered ‘we’-
concept. My point here has been to illuminate that such a normative challenge is deemed 
particularly disturbing for its emotional connotations with betrayal and subversion of the ‘true 
Self’. The discursive power of ‘normative threat eastern Europe’ (cf. ‘normative power 
Europe’; Manners 2002) is specifically efficient for the trope’s resonance with a well-anchored 
depiction of eastern Europe as a liminal figure in the (western/liberal) European mindscapes. 
OS literature has shown how existential anxieties can range from agonizing over fate and death, 
emptiness and meaninglessness, guilt and condemnation (Browning 2018, 350). The 
resurgence of ‘eastern Europe’ as a normative threat to the modern European project reflects 
collective angst over the contested meaning and the possible demise of the European venture.  
Democracy’s viability as a political form depends on the enduring commitment to 
debate with others who have different views (Kinnvall and Mitzen 2018; Müller 2016c). If 
‘[c]ountering the twenty-first century autocrat requires a twenty-first century democrat’ (Frantz 
                                                 




and Kendall-Taylor 2017, 66), an attempt at making sense of the normative threat in question 
is a more prudent and productive strategy than the condemnation reflex of the illiberal ‘Other’, 
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